Why are we dithering?
Everyone agrees that it's in Canada's long-term strategic interests - both militarily and economically - to be able to produce its own naval vessels. And everyone agrees that a continuous-build policy that guarantees stable work for our shipyards is what's required to re-establish and maintain that capability. Between the navy, DFO, crown corporations like BC Ferries and the like, it's not like there's not enough work to justify such a policy.
So why are we even talking about this?
Prime Minister Harper, make a commitment, sign the papers, and get it done. Pitter patter.
So why are we even talking about this?
Prime Minister Harper, make a commitment, sign the papers, and get it done. Pitter patter.
3 Comments:
Canada went from the 3rd largest navy in WW2, building most of the Lancasters and other planes that fought for Britain; thence the promising Avro Arrow and the 30-years ahead of the times Bras D'Or hydrofoil.. to our situation today, after too much Liberal military-hatred. Used UK lemon-subs? A 40-year old navy, plus a 30 year old set of frigates? 50 year old helicopters? All good.
We need to have the best to defend our sovereignty and freedom... let's go shopping until we can get our own programs up-to-speed again. It will take a generation, but it took two generations to ruin it.
In the meanwhile, let's get some U.S. choppers; some German U212 next-gen subs; some Scandanavia super-coastal frigates for drug-indictment & coastal defense; some transport planes, new f-22 fighters, and whatever else it takes to be a big-boy nation, to do our peace-keeping and warmaking and contribution to the world we now live in, not the post-USSR happy-time of hand-holding and dreams of endless peace.
We need a diversified fast-response armed forces, ready to respond when and where needed for military or civil or terror-emergencies. We need to do it now.
I think the fear in Ottawa is that the various "interests" i.e "Provinces" would be lined up screaming how Ottawa has screwed them over and favoured some other region
Just think "Danny, the Mouth that Roared Williams" and you can understand the potential issues.
Not saying it is impossible but they will need a different paradigm.
But it is a great idea . . .
A couple of years ago Australia had a Senate inquiry into shipbuilding, specifically naval shipbuilding, and a few things came out of that:
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/fadt_ctte/completed_inquiries/2004-07/shipping/report/index.htm
1) While shipbuilding was a desirable strategic industry on a number of levels, the critical skills that Defence felt they really needed was the capacity for large project management as well as the repair, maintenance and upgrade of warships -- activities that have a far greater impact on readiness and capability than build times. Shipbuilding was one path to those skills, but perhaps not the only one. The metal bashing skills were relatively easy to acquire, especially with a mature oil and gas/mining sector. In fact, shipbuilding wasn't necessarily considered a discreet industry anymore but part of a 'flexible heavy engineering industry'.
2) If you have a busy oil and gas/mining sector and labour is tight, naval shipbuilding may actually decrease national wealth by driving up wages for both sectors. It was consideration of this factor (as well as an existing build program for the Air Warfare Destroyers) that made it acceptable politics for the LHDs to be largely constructed (but not integrated) offshore in Spain. (In this respect, the shipbuilding inquiry was partly a political exercise. It was necessary for some of these arguments to be aired publicly and for detractors to have their say before an offshore build could be sold to the public.)
3) It won't surprise anyone to learn that there is a premium to a small, local build. Now that premium may be worth paying if it is to achieve an industry capability that you need (for strategic reasons). The key is articulating exactly what it is you want to achieve and that means treating some industry capabilities the same as you would defence capabilities: namely, deciding what level of capability you want, finding ways of measuring them and, if need be, contributing to the maintenance of them. In Australia, that sometimes means partially subsidising the training of key defence industry skills (program managers, engineers, etc). Now I hate industry subsidies as much as the next guy, but if a few million dollars worth of training avoids a billion-dollar blowout, I can live with that. It also means, however, that once the minimum strategic capability has been achieved in a certain strategic industry, the promise of further subsidy (beyond maintenance of the minimum) falls away. That's kind of another factor in what has happened with the LHD build. The AWD build program has provided the minimum onshore shipbuilding component allowing an offshore build for anything else.
Now, personally, I think serious consideration of points 1 & 2 mean that countries of the size of Australia and Canada could probably get away with something less than a full time naval shipbuilding industry (of any size) and deliver some real savings to the defence budget and the taxpayer by purchasing the hulls (or modules) of warships offshore. Nevertheless, even in Australia, that was a bridge too far politically. Still, they might be the sorts of considerations that need to be explored in Canada to avoid trying to build big, complex vessels like the JSS (that require massive one-off infrastructure like large dry docks) when a long run of frigates and patrol vessels is all you really want as a strategic industry.
How any of that fits in a Canadian political environment, I don't know. Just my thoughts.
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