Thursday, January 24, 2008

Afstan: Pessimism and optimism/US Military and Pakistan

Maybe things are not quite as bad--nor as good. And maybe something can be done in Pakistan.

1) Pessimism:
“WELL, at least we’re not in Baghdad,” we used to say when confronted by the vagaries of the Kabul winter. No heat, sporadic electricity and growing disaffection among the population might make us uncomfortable, but those of us living outside the smothering embrace of the embassies or the United Nations had relative freedom of movement and few security worries.

And of course we had the Serena hotel. Its spa offered solace, a gym and a hot shower; we could pretend for a few hours that we were in Dubai.

But a week ago last Monday, Taliban gunmen burst into the lobby, one exploding his ball-bearing vest, one running to the gym and spa area, spraying bullets as he went. Eight people died, and several more were wounded.

It was a rude shock for those of us who used to feel superior to those who cowered behind their reinforced walls, venturing out only in bulletproof glass surrounded by convoys of big men with big guns...

I am no stranger to the insurgency, having spent three years in Afghanistan and much of the past 12 months in Helmand Province. Helmand, center of opium and Taliban, may be the most unstable region of the country. It is also the scene of some of the fiercest fighting in Afghanistan, with British troops clashing frequently with the rebels.

For the past several months we have been hearing that NATO is winning, that the insurgency is running out of steam. Each suicide attack is a last gasp, a sign that the Taliban are becoming desperate.

As the enemy melts away only to regroup, we are expected to believe that this time, surely, they will stay put in their hideouts. The head of the Afghan National Security Directorate described the Serena attack as a sign of the Taliban’s weakness. “An enemy that cannot hold territory, an enemy that has no support among the people, has no other means than suicide bombing,” the security chief, Amrullah Saleh, told assembled reporters.

But those of us who have covered the steady decline of hope in Afghanistan over the past three years know where the relative strength lies.

Not with the central government, whose head, Hamid Karzai, has largely lost the respect of his people with his increasingly bizarre behavior: weeping at the plight of children in Kandahar, begging the Taliban to send him their address, confessing that he is powerless to control the warlords, auctioning off his silken robe to feed widows and orphans.

Not with the foreign troops, who have been unable to provide security or usher in the development that Afghanistan so desperately needs. Civilian casualties, often hushed up or denied, have made NATO a curse in some parts of the country.

Not with the international assistance community, with its misguided counter-narcotics policies, high-priced consultants and wasteful practices. Out of the billions that have supposedly come into the country, only a trickle has been used to good effect.

The Taliban, under whose brutal regime Afghanistan became an international pariah, are steadily regaining ground. Even those who deplore their harsh rules and capricious behavior welcome the illusion of security they bring in their wake...

Jean MacKenzie is the Afghanistan country director for the Institute of War and Peace Reporting.
2) Optimism (well, sort of):
A senior U.S. military commander said on Wednesday he did not expect the Taliban to mount a major offensive in eastern Afghanistan this spring, but experts warned of rising violence and a stronger insurgency.

Army Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez, the top commander of NATO troops in eastern Afghanistan, said Afghan security forces and other civilian authorities had established a stronger presence in the east of the country...

"The people of Afghanistan don't want the Taliban back and the strength of their institutions has grown significantly in the last year," he said at the Pentagon...

U.S. officials say eastern Afghanistan, which borders Pakistan, has become substantially more stable in the past year, thanks to the work of U.S. troops and Afghan officials in countering the influence of Taliban Islamist militants.

But violence overall in Afghanistan has risen steadily for more than two years.

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. military's Joint Chiefs of Staff, said last month that total violence was up 27 percent from a year ago and up more than 60 percent in the southern province of Helmand, scene of the heaviest fighting.

Retired Lt. Gen. David Barno, former U.S. commander in Afghanistan, told Congress on Wednesday the security situation has deteriorated significantly since 2004 and the Taliban has clearly gained strength.

"The enemy in Afghanistan -- a collection of al Qaeda, Taliban, Hezb-e Islami and foreign fighters -- is unquestionably a much stronger force than the enemy we faced in 2004," Barno told the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee.

"I'm afraid it is an undeniable fact," he said.

Barno said the number of roadside bombs in Afghanistan climbed from 325 in 2004 to 1,469 last year. The number of suicide bombings soared from three in 2004 to more than 130 in 2007, according to Barno.

While Rodriguez painted an optimistic picture, Barno and other experts testifying on Capitol Hill said U.S. and NATO success against the Taliban will depend directly on Pakistan's willingness and ability to clamp down on al Qaeda and Taliban fighters based in its remote, largely ungoverned border area...
As for Pakistan:
The U.S. military plans to significantly expand and accelerate its counterinsurgency training and provision of equipment for Pakistan's armed forces this year as part of a five-year, $2 billion U.S.-Pakistani effort to help stabilize the country, senior U.S. and Pakistani officials said.

The enhanced cooperation will include U.S. military assistance toward counterinsurgency training, technical gear and assistance to improve the Pakistani military's intelligence gathering and its air and ground mobility, the officials said. If requested by Pakistan, it could also involve U.S. Special Operations Forces working with the Pakistani military as it launches "more aggressive" actions against insurgents in northwest tribal areas, said Ambassador Dell L. Dailey, the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator...

U.S. officials said the new strategy is critical, as insurgents once focused on Afghanistan have turned inward to challenge the Pakistani government. "The plan to counter insurgents is to work with the Pakistanis to share intelligence, increase cross-border cooperation between ourselves, the Afghans and the Pakistanis, and to work with Pakistan's military to increase their capability," Adm. William Fallon, the top U.S. commander for the Middle East, told The Washington Post this week...

Much of the increased U.S. military cooperation will be tailored to improve the counterinsurgency operations [a current one at link] of the Pakistani military and Frontier Corps, a large but ill-equipped force that has suffered most of the government's combat casualties in tribal areas. For example, it will involve sending in small teams of U.S. trainers, including Special Forces soldiers, as well as technical experts to work with the Pakistani Air Force and intelligence personnel. The U.S. military is planning to expand the number of trainers for Pakistan's Frontier Corps, possibly including contractors or allied forces, and is also seeking to tap into $37 million in counterterrorism funds for that effort, according to U.S. officials...

1 Comments:

Anonymous Anonymous said...

and our enemies have their own problems that we should exploit.

Taliban Troubles Escalate
January 24, 2008: There are some serious internal rifts in the Taliban, and also tensions between the Taliban and al Qaeda. At the center of it all is Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar, who desperately wants to regain power in Afghanistan. This may be one reason why some Pakistani Taliban leaders have signed truces with the Pakistani government, so the movement can focus on Afghanistan. But al Qaeda has larger ambitions, and would like to leverage the Taliban's influence with the Pushtun tribes (on both sides of the border) to further the jihad in Pakistan.



There are other problems as well. Mullah Omar has "sacked" Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, and then indicated that what he really did was just cut Mehsud loose. That's mainly because Mehsud is a powerful tribal leader, and no one in the region dares to defy him by accepting Omars appointment as new leader of the Pakistani Taliban. Apparently Omar does not have enough power among Mehsud's jihadis (core Taliban fighters) to actually remove him from command.

rtr @ http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20080124.aspx

10:49 a.m., January 24, 2008  

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