Procurement, and the reporting thereof

I have no idea if DND purchased the right targeting pod for the CF-18 upgrades. The contract specifications and results are mostly under wraps, so nobody other than those involved in the process as a seller or a buyer really knows for sure, and none of them are allowed to talk openly about it.

Which doesn't mean some haven't spoken clandestinely about it, mostly in order to boost their own position, I suspect. Unfortunately, that's made the coverage of what might be an important story somewhat sketchy.

First off the mark was CTV's Graham Richardson in print and on video. The on-air piece is so riddled with errors, I don't know where to begin.

Wait, strike that, I do know: the idea that this contract was for "smart bombs." It was, in fact, for a complex electronic device that does not go boom:

The Advanced Multi-Role Infrared Sensor is a targeting pod that is mounted on the weapons station of the CF-18. It is a state of the art electro-optic and infrared sensor, which includes a laser designator, a laser marker and a tactical data link capability.

“The AMIRS pod will provide the CF-18 with enhanced targeting as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that make it an invaluable asset for the Canadian Forces’ air, land and sea operations,” said Lieutenant-General Steve Lucas, Chief of the Air Staff. “The modernized, combat-effective, multi-purpose and globally deployable CF-18 fleet will continue to play an important role over the next decade as the Air Force transforms to meet the 21st century security needs of Canada.”

AMIRS is about targeting and ISR (watching closely what's happening on the ground). It's not about getting our CF-18's "outfitted with laser-guided smart-bombs" as Richardson says. He's just plain dead wrong on that.

Secondly, we've had technology that does this in a less capable way for years now:

In 1998, Canada purchased nine AN/AAS-38B NITE Hawk laser targeting pods to allow the CF-18 to deliver precision guided munitions. (Three more pods were later bought as spares). The NITE Hawk is carried on the CF-18’s portside ‘shoulder’ station (right). The AAS-38B was used during OP Echo, NATO’s bombing campaign in the Balkans when CF-18s flew from Aviano, Italy against targets first in Kosovo, then in Serbia itself.

The NITE Hawk was an obvious choice at the time. A small number of early model AAS-38s had been trialed by US Navy F/A-18s during the first Gulf War. And the NITE Hawk was considered one of the better ‘second-generation’ targeting pods. However, the next generation of precision-guided munitions required a new pod.

Note that we've actually used our CF-18's in real-life bombing operations, in concert with our allies, with the older technology.

Richardson goes on to make the point that the AMIRS contract wasn't awarded to the lowest-cost bidder. That would be a real red flag, if only the procurement had been framed as a lowest-cost purchase. Except that it wasn't, it was a best-value procurement, one that is supposed to take into account a whole list of factors above and beyond purchase price. And we have no idea - Richardson included, I'd wager - which system will actually provide the best value.

Furthermore, Richardson's suggestion that "if the Air Force ever wants to help out in Afghanistan and relieve the stress on the ground troops there, they need this technology; they can't operate in any theatre with the British and Americans without this technology" is bunk from start to finish. The Air Force is already "helping out" in Afghanistan by getting personnel and materiel to and from Kandahar (a gargantuan logistics operation), by operating a kick-ass Tactical Air Unit in theatre, by operating a TUAV (surveillance drone) unit at KAF, and by staffing hundreds of positions at both CEFCOM and on the ground in theatre with airmen and airwomen (can we not just find one name to fit both genders, please?). Any deployment of CF-18's to Kandahar wouldn't necessarily relieve the stress on ground troops there, because they're not short of CAS right now. And here's the kicker: our CF-18's actually can operate alongside our allies without this particular piece of kit. Would that interaction be optimal? No. But the more significant restrictions on our CF-18's come from other avionics issues, not from the lack of a targeting pod:

Phase I of modernization

This first phase of CF-18 modernization is a cornerstone project that entails the procurement and installation of a new radar, “Have-Quick” jam-resistant radios, combined interrogator/ transponders, stores management systems, mission computers and embedded global positioning systems/inertial navigation systems.

...

Phase II will outfit Canada’s CF-18s with the latest in technologically advanced equipment.

The fighter jets will be equipped with a secure data and communications link that allow CF-18 crews to stay in constant contact with other jets, ground stations and airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) to maintain awareness in their constantly evolving environment.

New state-of-the-art colour display panels will provide pilots with improved access to flight data and communications. The colour displays will significantly improve the pilots’ ability to refine the reams of data they receive. Pilots’ helmets will be outfitted with new visors that display readings from the instrument panel, so that they can maintain visual contact with a target without having to look down into the cockpit to monitor flight instruments. A new ejection seat, in support of this new helmet display system, will also be procured under Phase II. The aircraft will also be outfitted with a new missile countermeasures chaff/flare dispenser.

The real reason our CF-18's aren't in theatre, though, is that we don't need them to be at this point. Oh, I'd like for Canadian pilots to be supporting Canadian ground troops, since it would likely lower the number of blue-on-blue incidents, and even if it didn't, it would stifle the cries of "cowboy Americans" we hear all too often. But the truth, when you talk to guys on the ground, is that CF units are rarely without what's called "fast air" - the jets that drop bombs and strafe enemy positions - on call. It's one area where ISAF forces aren't lacking.

David Akin also weighed in on this issue, and was the beneficiary of some excellent qualifying and correcting information from our own Chris Taylor:

[from Akin] Remember in Gulf War I when we saw video of a missile zeroing in on a target and then explode? Well, that's smart bomb stuff. The U.S. have it. The U.K. has it. Even the French have it. (That's why they were able to deploy Mirage fighters into Afghanistan recently to support NATO troops there.) But Canada's fighter jets don't have it.

We know we need it, mind you. Five years ago, Canada's Air Force generals started the ball rolling to put these systems on our fighter jets.

[from Taylor] That's only partially correct, David. We have had the second-generation AN/AAS-38B NITE Hawk laser targeting pods for precision-guided munitions since 1998. And we used them over Serbia in 1999.

But as in every other aspect of life, technology is not static. The old target pods are not good enough to operate the third-gen bomb guidance hardware at the level of precision desired. That is why a brand-new targeting pod (the Advanced Multi-Role Infrared Sensor, or AMIRS) is required. And where the next-gen pods really shine is not targeting, per se, but ISR -- intelligence, surveillance and reconnaisance. A good ISR pod turns an ordinary pointy-nosed turn-and-burn fighter into an intelligence platform not unlike a Predator UAV. Giving us the ability to snoop and shoot as the situation requires.

Meanwhile we still have the ability to drop bombs with less-precise precision guidance using the old pods.

And you may be interested to know that the LockMart Sniper XR pod is being tested by USAF, RAF and RN on a variety of platforms. It's a little disingenuous to suggest that the die is already cast and everyone is selecting Litening III. The aviation arms of most of our major allies, including the US and the UK, use a mixture of Litening and Sniper pods, depending on the avionics and interface capabilities of the various airframes that they fly.

Not every pointy-nosed-fighter has compatible mounting, targeting and data transfer methods. A mix of pod types is necessary for a fleet with many different platforms. We can get away with one because we've only got one type of ground attack fighter.

It's not as cut and dried as you make it out to be.

Well and fairly spanked, I'd say.

So that's where the reporting went off the rails - with one notable exception.

Here's what we know for sure: the Canadian International Trade Tribunal has said that errors were made in the bid evaluations. CTV's Richardson blows even this tidbit of news by saying the tribunal has instructed the government to "redo large parts of the process." That's just flat out wrong. Here's what the tribunal actually said:

78. Pursuant to subsections 30.15(2) and (3) of the CITT Act, the Tribunal recommends, as a remedy, that PWGSC, within 30 days of the publication of this determination, re-evaluate the proposals with respect to rated criteria R13 and R44 of the RFP for all three bidders. The Tribunal further recommends that, in accordance with the Evaluation Plan: (1) regarding rated criterion R13, PWGSC permit the use of RMS and any other technically supportable definitions of the term “error”; and (2) regarding rated criterion R44, PWGSC award points to only those stores that were cleared or certified prior to bid closing and for which adequate documentation was provided. If this re-evaluation results in the identification of a different winning bidder for the contract, the existing contract should be cancelled and awarded to that bidder.

I know there's a lot of gobbledygook in there, but the essence of it is that the tribunal has asked the government to go back and reassess two points of the bid process. That's two, out of a total of forty-some-odd, which hardly qualifies as "large parts of the process."

The problem, as I see it, is that one of those criteria seems to be an all-or-nothing concern:

55. Northrop submitted that simply providing test and analysis reports, without clearance or certification at the time of bid submittal, is not responsive to rated criterion R44. Northrop submitted that Lockheed was clearly awarded points on the basis that its stores could be cleared or certified, not that they were already cleared or certified. It claimed that its complaint was never that the proof of existing clearance or certification came from a “government authority”, as alleged by PWGSC, but rather that Lockheed did not provide any clearance or certification in its bid...

...

58. In the Tribunal’s view, the wording of the detailed scoring methodology found in section 5.2.11.2 of the Evaluation Plan makes it clear that, for a bidder’s proposal to receive points from the evaluators, clearance or certification was required prior to bid submission and that the documentation supporting the claim was to accompany the proposal. The Tribunal notes that answer 35 of amendment No. 12 indicated that “. . . it may be possible for some stores to be cleared purely by analysis . . .”, but it believes that this statement merely indicates that analysis may be acceptable as substantiation for certification. It does not indicate that the analysis is an acceptable alternative to certification. Because the Tribunal is of the opinion that the RFP required clearance or certification at the time of bid closing, the Tribunal finds that PWGSC failed to evaluate the bids according to the RFP and, hence, failed to observe the requirement of Article 506(6) of the AIT.

In other words, because of a lack of precise language in the competition specifications, LockMart was awarded points in their bid that the tribunal thinks it shouldn't have been. And if points were awarded, it's obvious to me that the Air Force thinks LockMart's answer was good enough - it's just that the bid evaluation criteria weren't written in a way that accurately portrayed the evaluators' intent.

That's the real big deal in all of this.

Which brings me to an article this morning by Aaron Plamondon in The Calgary Herald:

The Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) is still bad at business. The Canadian International Trade Tribunal announced last week that a $126-million program to outfit CF-18 fighter jets with new targeting systems may have been given to the wrong contractor.

Although the contract has been signed with Lockheed Martin, deliveries are being made, and the system is currently being tested in Cold Lake, the decision may force DND to select a new supplier for technology that will help the CF-18s track enemy targets and facilitate smart-bomb technology.

Plamondon details, in an agonizing historical parade of incompetence and mismanagement, the Canadian government's seeming inability to get defence procurement right. In this, he's all too correct: we haven't mastered the process.

What he doesn't acknowledge is that we're beginning to. Part of the problem with procurement at DND is that they don't have much practice with making things work well and quickly at the same time, and are learning on the go. Part of the problem is that we simply don't have enough people to handle all the projects that are on the go right now (hence the C-17 taking precedence while the C-130J and CH-47 processes cool their heels to some degree, waiting for their turn in the bureaucratic spotlight).

Remember, NDHQ took the Globemaster acquisition from a politician's idea to first tail delivery in eighteen months. A multibillion-dollar project, that. And the Leopard acquisition was brilliant: using existing money, getting maximum value by buying mothballed stores in a market glut, and securing a loaner from allies in the meantime. Brilliant stuff. So you can't say they're not getting better.

But as this story goes to show, there's still a long way to go for the purchasing teams at DND. Of course, given the way the story was mangled by CTV journalists, I'd say the same thing about defence reporting in this country: there's still an awfully long way to go. Giddeup, folks.