Afstan: The insurgency strengthened and Canada did not quit

Eugene Lang, chief of staff to two Liberal ministers of national defence, implies that hanging in is not the correct response. He even uses the dreaded "I" word: "Some analysts have suggested we are now witnessing the 'Iraqification' of Afghanistan."

The Harper government claims that committing Canada's military to southern Afghanistan until 2009 merely extends an existing mission approved by the previous government. This is misleading. Circumstances have changed measurably since the original decision to put Canadian troops in Kandahar -- today, Canada is fighting an unanticipated war there, which is having a profound effect on Canadian foreign policy. Hence, the extension of Canada's mission should be viewed as quite a departure from the original commitment...

...the situation on the ground in Kandahar...has altered fundamentally since the original decision to send our troops back to that region. It was known when the current mission was approved that Kandahar was the most dangerous and unstable part of Afghanistan, that Canada's military would be fighting Taliban insurgents, and that casualties would be taken. It was expected to be a very tough, dangerous, one-year combat assignment.

The Martin government approved the current mission -- with both a reconstruction and a combat force -- on the basis of three core assumptions or principles:
...
Three: Canadian Forces would be capable of deploying a significant ground force to another global trouble spot in 2007, if required...

The level and intensity of fighting, the insurgents' persistence, and the extent of Western casualties, which in Canada's case has far exceeded in the past six months that of the previous four years of our involvement in Afghanistan, was not anticipated by anyone -- including Canada, NATO, the Afghan government and the Americans -- when the Martin government committed to a combat role in Kandahar 18 months ago.

By contrast, the Harper government extended Canada's combat mission amid the current insurgency, with full knowledge of its severity and consequences. The government must have been cognizant that this mission was consuming the Canadian Forces, and in particular the army, in a way not previously anticipated. It was known, given the deteriorating situation on the ground, that extending our combat commitment would severely limit for years the capacity of Canada's army to be deployed to other countries or regions -- in peacekeeping, peace support or combat roles -- in the service of Canadian foreign policy...

...given the situation on the ground in Kandahar [maybe not so bad, Eugene - MC], and how this affects Canada's military capacity and foreign-policy latitude for the next few years, it is disingenuous to characterize this as a benign extension of a pre-existing mission from a previous government. It is anything but that.

The clear inference from Mr Lang's article is that, if the going gets tough, it's time to get out as soon as decently possible. Maybe in search of other missions that might be easier.

And you will note that Mr Lang makes it clear that even if the Afstan combat mission were to end in 2007 the Canadian Army would not have the strength to do anything significant elsewhere this year (just in case you think we should be doing something in Lebanon, Darfur, Haiti, wherever, that would in some unfathomable sense be more moral and worthy than what we are doing in Afstan now and until 2009).

Canadian values at their best.