The Trouble with Salutin
Rick Salutin tells us (“At the ready, but where’s the war?” July 7) that the CIA has declared that the leadership of Al Qaeda, formerly headquartered in Afghanistan, no longer constitutes a threat to Western security. If this is true, and if the CIA is right, I am relieved. However, I have a little trouble with where Salutin goes from there.
He tells us that the flourishing of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan during the late 1990s and the Taliban rule of that country during the same period were fundamentally unrelated circumstances (“they’d probably have dealt Osama to the U.S. for some aid and security”). He goes on to imply that the Taliban actually were, and presumably remain, a force for good (“they… had established a modicum of stability and had no international terror pretensions.”)
Interesting. It is, of course, possible that the geographical and temporal coincidence of the rise of the Taliban and that of Al Qaeda could have been simple accident. In considering the credibility of such a possibility, however, a few facts – unmentioned by Salutin – deserve citation. The rules and laws brought into general application in Afghanistan by the Taliban bear an astonishing resemblance to those advocated for worldwide application by Al Qaeda. To recall, those laws made refusal of fidelity to Islam a capital offence, and required women to abstain from education, employment, independent mobility, and appearance in public - except swaddled head-to-toe in cloth - on pain of corporal or worse punishment. Such a close similarity of ideology more than suggests a likelihood of mutual sympathy and aid. More practically: we know that the leadership of Al Qaeda and that of the Taliban did in fact share each others’ hospitality and resources, extending to intermarriage, and to fleeing, hiding and fighting together when the U.S. moved against Al Qaeda post-9/11. Further: quite contrary to Salutin’s claim, the Taliban in 2001 openly and defiantly affirmed their allegiance to Al Qaeda at precisely the moment when an opposite declaration and action would have secured to them boundless reward, rather than utter ruin, at American hands. As for the Taliban bringing “stability” to Afghanistan: if I not mistaken, many people around the world said the same of the Nazis and Germany during the 1930s.
Less important than Salutin’s interpretation of the past is his recipe for the future. His implied recommendation is that Canada and other nations should refuse the Afghan government’s request for continuing security assistance. Presumably Salutin understands that such a course would lead directly and promptly to the re-conquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban. What, I wonder, are the mechanisms Salutin imagines would guarantee a Taliban reversal of their past attitude toward civil society and civil rights (assuming he sees anything wrong with that attitude), and that international terrorism would not again be incubated under their noses? Ah, that’s right: no guarantees necessary. The Taliban are a force for good, and their apparent tolerance of Al Qaeda leaders and training camps was just coincidence - kind of like the Liberals and corruption. Perhaps Salutin’s interpretation of the past is relevant after all?
POSTED BY WALSINGHAM at THE MONARCHIST
He tells us that the flourishing of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan during the late 1990s and the Taliban rule of that country during the same period were fundamentally unrelated circumstances (“they’d probably have dealt Osama to the U.S. for some aid and security”). He goes on to imply that the Taliban actually were, and presumably remain, a force for good (“they… had established a modicum of stability and had no international terror pretensions.”)
Interesting. It is, of course, possible that the geographical and temporal coincidence of the rise of the Taliban and that of Al Qaeda could have been simple accident. In considering the credibility of such a possibility, however, a few facts – unmentioned by Salutin – deserve citation. The rules and laws brought into general application in Afghanistan by the Taliban bear an astonishing resemblance to those advocated for worldwide application by Al Qaeda. To recall, those laws made refusal of fidelity to Islam a capital offence, and required women to abstain from education, employment, independent mobility, and appearance in public - except swaddled head-to-toe in cloth - on pain of corporal or worse punishment. Such a close similarity of ideology more than suggests a likelihood of mutual sympathy and aid. More practically: we know that the leadership of Al Qaeda and that of the Taliban did in fact share each others’ hospitality and resources, extending to intermarriage, and to fleeing, hiding and fighting together when the U.S. moved against Al Qaeda post-9/11. Further: quite contrary to Salutin’s claim, the Taliban in 2001 openly and defiantly affirmed their allegiance to Al Qaeda at precisely the moment when an opposite declaration and action would have secured to them boundless reward, rather than utter ruin, at American hands. As for the Taliban bringing “stability” to Afghanistan: if I not mistaken, many people around the world said the same of the Nazis and Germany during the 1930s.
Less important than Salutin’s interpretation of the past is his recipe for the future. His implied recommendation is that Canada and other nations should refuse the Afghan government’s request for continuing security assistance. Presumably Salutin understands that such a course would lead directly and promptly to the re-conquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban. What, I wonder, are the mechanisms Salutin imagines would guarantee a Taliban reversal of their past attitude toward civil society and civil rights (assuming he sees anything wrong with that attitude), and that international terrorism would not again be incubated under their noses? Ah, that’s right: no guarantees necessary. The Taliban are a force for good, and their apparent tolerance of Al Qaeda leaders and training camps was just coincidence - kind of like the Liberals and corruption. Perhaps Salutin’s interpretation of the past is relevant after all?
POSTED BY WALSINGHAM at THE MONARCHIST
posted by The Monarchist at 10:01 a.m.
2 Comments:
Observor69: There was no "foreign invasion" of Afghanistan.
Before the fall of Kabul, and of most of the rest of Afghanistan, to the insurgent Afghan Northern Alliance in November 2001--and the consequent collapse of the Taliban regime--there were no foreign regular combat formations in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance did receive air support and assistance from special forces (both US and British); that however is not an invasion. Substantial foreign ground combat forces--including Canadian--only entered the country after the Taliban had been deposed by indigenous Afghan forces, and those foreign troops entered with the agreement of the Northern Alliance.
This is no mere semantic quibble. Describing what the US and UK did in Afghanistan as an "invasion" tends to equate those actions in people's minds with the real invasion of Iraq. That equation implicitly and wrongly calls into question the legitimacy of NATO and Coalition actions in Afghanistan, which have been authorised unanimously by the UN Security Council.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8641.doc.htm
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8495.doc.htm
It is most unfortunate that the mythical "invasion" of Afghanistan has become common currency amongst journalists and commentators. This misnomer can only help increase extremism amongst susceptible Muslims, the very thing Mr Portillo wishes to combat.
This stupid invasion myth is pernicious.
And guess what. Pakistan is still involved with the Taliban.http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2006/07/afstan-pakistan-problem.html
Dyer still needs a new jacket and some thinking.
Mark
Ottawa
Reminds me of this drivel by Eric Margolis:
""None of this is true. In 1989, at the end of the Soviet occupation, Afghanistan fell into anarchy and civil war. An epidemic of banditry and rape ensued. A village prayer leader, Mullah Omar, who lost an eye in the anti-Soviet jihad, armed a group of `talibs' (religious students), and set about defending women from rape. Aided by Pakistan, Taliban stopped the epidemic of rape and drug dealing that had engulfed Afghanistan, and imposed order based on harsh tribal and Sharia religious law."
Here is an excerpt from a piece I have been working on that is a little more accurate:
"The Taliban was probably one of the most repressive regimes of modern times. Omar, as leader, became Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful) and the immediately formed the Ministry for Ordering What Is Right and Forbidding What Is Wrong.
Although claiming to be instituting pure Islamic law, many of the Taliban edicts had more to do with tribal customs than the Qur’an. They banned music, dancing, movies, closed down television stations and destroyed priceless artefacts that depicted living beings. They passed laws forbidding clapping, kite flying, and squeaky shoes and all men were ordered to grow full, untrimmed beards. Women were forced to wear burkas from head to toe and were forbidden to work or go to school. As a result, hospitals were almost completely unstaffed and orphanages were abandoned. Thousands of widows from the war were unable to earn money for even the most basic necessities.
Religious police enforced strict laws and punished anyone who disobeyed. Men were beaten with sticks to force them to pray in mosques. Murder, drug dealing and adultery were punishable by death, theft by the amputation of a hand. Women were beaten or stoned for not being dressed properly or being escorted by men not related to them and anyone not found praying at the dictated times was imprisoned. Many of the punishments were administered on the spot without any legal process or opportunity for defence."
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