"Gov't shipbuilding strategy moving towards launch?"/Musings on the CF's future
Start of topic thread (mine) at Milnet.ca:
From an earlier post:
Whether we need fighters with full capabilities for airspace patrol/interception, air-to-air combat, and precise ground attack is another good question since the government has been unwilling even to use our CF-18s to support troops in Afstan.
Also, why not consider
At some point decisions will have to be made on re-shaping the CF. But governments, and the services themselves, are completely unwilling to face up to issue. So in the future those decisions will likely be made in a fashion that has not been well thought through. With lord knows what results.
Lots more along similar lines at the second part of this post:
Update: Babbling's corking post just after this one touches on the same fundamental theme (though we do differ about the Navy)--and I share his weariness:
It seems to me that this, completely politically motivated (and the Liberals would do nothing very different), can only guarantee greatly added costs and slower delivery--and as for number of ships...Some earlier relevant posts:
JSS: "a compromise between an AOR and a troop ship capable of supporting an amphibious landing is exactly that: a compromise that does neither"I simply do not believe that all the equipment purchases the government has promised under its "Canada First Defence Strategy" (it's not a strategy, it's essentially a shopping list--see 2. Equipment here, plus list here) will be affordable in the current budgetary climate. After all, the government has already reneged on the commitments it made for stable future funding increases. A government of any other political stripe will not be even that, er, generous.
Musings on the JSS...
What the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (A/OPSs) are all about
From an earlier post:
...In my own view, given ineluctable funding crunches, a substantial blue-water fleet is the least important part of our military in terms of both national interests and what governments actually use the CF for in foreign policy terms (in almost all major cases the Army, with Air Force logistical support).
I do believe that some future government will be forced to conclude that procuring all the types of equipment above [see link] for the three services is simply unaffordable, and that a serious review of the services' missions must be undertaken to determine which capablities can be eliminated or reduced. Unless the services are to, er, soldier on with clapped-out, increasingly ineffective, equipment.
In other words, some government must decide what operational capabilities of the CF are vital to the national interest and therefore must be funded. And which capabilities are not essential. Otherwise Canada will end up with three services, each of which is trying to be as close as it can be to all-singing and all-dancing (the "multi-purpose, combat-capable forces" mantra--boy is a new White Paper needed). But those services will in fact end up increasingly off-tune and out of step. Because the money will not be there to let the show go on...
Whether we need fighters with full capabilities for airspace patrol/interception, air-to-air combat, and precise ground attack is another good question since the government has been unwilling even to use our CF-18s to support troops in Afstan.
Also, why not consider
A civilian maritime patrol aircraft fleet?to relieve the Air Force of the non-military missions its patrol aircfraft perform and to rationalize and make more effective the government's existing civilian patrol activities?
At some point decisions will have to be made on re-shaping the CF. But governments, and the services themselves, are completely unwilling to face up to issue. So in the future those decisions will likely be made in a fashion that has not been well thought through. With lord knows what results.
Lots more along similar lines at the second part of this post:
British defence budget woes--a lesson for Canada too?Still, if something could be done about the insistence on building vessels in Canada (a breach in designing them here has finally been made), and about Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs, see Benefits to Canadian Communities) generally, budget constraints might be lessened somewhat. Ah, to dream...
Update: Babbling's corking post just after this one touches on the same fundamental theme (though we do differ about the Navy)--and I share his weariness:
...
At the end of the day, both situations - the navy's problems [see here], and the Congo idea [lots more here] - can be traced back to a lack of serious thought in this country about defence issues at all. And I'll be honest with you: I'm getting increasingly tired of trying to make those same arguments again and again and again.
We're getting precisely the defence policy we, as a country, are demanding. What a sad statement that is.
3 Comments:
Sorry Mark, I cannot disagree with you more. Gulf War 1 and 2, 911, Haiti, Katrina, etc. Who was the first out of the gate and was able to provide effective support to our allies without:
Hitching a ride with rentals or other allies; and
Requiring overflight clearances and waiting our turn to land.
Thats right, the easily disposable blue water Navy that does nothing but eat away at the budget.
If Helleyer hadn't been mind f*d by UFO's and actually considered what he was doing he had a template just to the south of him.
The US Navy / Marine Corps TEAM. One does not work without the other. That is the way we should have gone, not the complete Charlie Foxtrot that we are still trying to fix today.
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Mr. Mitchell,
I couldn't agree more. I think that the original statement by mark sums up a central problem with the Canadian Navy -- it does a piss poor job of underlining what capabilities it possesses, and how those capabilities can be implemented to the benefit of Canadians and indeed the world.
In the aftermath of Haiti I can't number how many civilians asked me, as a member of the navy, if I'd partaken in the operation there. It was a very high-profile operation.
By all measures the ability to project the facilities and personnel into the local situation was could not be matched by the Army/Airforce. One of the shortcomings, however, was the limited logistical space offered aboard the 280 or Halifax classes. Imagine if MARCOM had the capability to offer more than a cobbled together contingent for a short term deployment, say a modern supply ship or amphibious platform. While not necessarily advocating the JSS in its current ("planned") iteration, such a ship would open up many options for Canadian involvement in military, stabilization, and humanitarian assistance operations that both the government, and I believe, the public would appreciate. If we possessed this I think the importance of the navy would be readily apparent
A truly unified effort as exemplified by the USN/ Marine Corps team would include all three CF elements in a way that the funding would be complementary rather than canabalizing. I'm sick of the arguments that we can Rob peter to pay Paul.
It's been proven time and again that all three branches have their strengths, and that the cost of supporting one at the detriment of the other leads to costly games of catchup down the road.
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