Afstan: Interview video with Gen. McKiernan/Americanization of the south

The general, commander of both ISAF and the newish separate command United States Forces - Afghanistan, is interviewed on the PBS NewsHour, March 17, about the overall situation in Afstan:



It's noteworthy (and Lord knows how the segment was edited) that one tends to get the impression that Afstan is now essentially the US versus the enemy (the truth, perhaps?). I heard the general mention ISAF only once.

It's also striking how the American media are approaching a full court press on Afstan, Iraq having rather receded as a focus. The increasing depth and breadth of that coverage is very welcome, especially in the face of the remarkably shallow coverage, on the whole, by the Canadian media (see this post of Babbling's). One supposes the American media have rather more of the esprit de sérieux than their "Gotcha!" Canadian cousins; plus a whole lot more money (at least so far) to fund reporting.

Another striking--and refreshing--thing: the much greater latitude of public expression members of the US armed services appear to have compared to their Canadian counterparts.

This was a post a few days ago about a Washington Post story on the greatly increasing US presence:

US really starting to shape things in ISAF Regional Command South

Now Jack Granatstein discusses the implications in a Globe and Mail article:

The Americans are coming, the Americans are coming - to Afghanistan

Whatever their views on Canada's mission in Afghanistan, Canadians like to believe that our troops are doing a first-rate job in "Canadahar" and that our allies, especially the Americans, believe this as well. But do the Americans agree with our rosy assessment? Perhaps not, if The Washington Post is to be believed.

A 2,000-word article on Sunday by Post staff writer Rajiv Chandrasekaran hangs on extensive interviews with Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Hurlbut, commander of the U.S. Army's 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment that operates under overall Canadian command in Kandahar province, and Brigadier-General John Nicholson, a deputy commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan. Neither seems very pleased with the way the war is going.

Col. Hurlbut told the reporter that his unit is making slow progress in the town of Maywand, 45 miles west of Kandahar. The Canadians came every few months to clear out the Taliban, Mr. Chandrasekaran reports, but then they left and the insurgents returned almost at once. Col. Hurlbut is trying a different approach, putting his troops in Maywand on a permanent basis. But the locals, after years of watching the Canadians roll in and out, "don't yet believe us when we say we're here to stay."

There is not a shred of perspective in the Post story [not that the Canadian media do better - MC].

After the Manley commission report in early 2008, the Canadian government mounted a full court press to get another 1,000 troops into Kandahar province if its 2,500-soldier commitment was to be extended to 2011. The Americans were the only NATO ally to step up to the plate, and Col. Hurlbut's unit was the result [emphasis added]. Of course, the Canadians, with fewer than 1,000 troops operating in the field, could not hold Maywand and the rest of the province; they lacked the resources to do so. Now the 2nd Battalion is there, doing what Canadian commanders and Parliament believed essential. But no one expects instant results any longer, not even Col. Hurlbut.

More worrying, perhaps, are Gen. Nicholson's comments. Serving as deputy to a Dutch commander in the south, Gen. Nicholson sounds as if he's the boss. "If we're going to win," he says, "we have to fight this war differently. ... We've had a stovepiped approach to combat and to development, too. All that has to change." With the Dutch in Uruzgan, the British in Helmand and the Canadians in Kandahar all taking their own approach to combat and reconstruction, the Americans believe, there was a complete lack of co-ordination. "It's a totally dysfunctional way of fighting a war," another American officer told the Post. "You've got each of these guys doing their own thing in their provinces with very little co-ordination."

Gen. Nicholson clearly sees it as his task to achieve this co-ordination, to secure "a coherent regional plan for victory, not a bunch of national plans for victory." But he does not want to "demand" - in Mr. Chandsrasekaran's phrase - that the allies scrap their individual approaches. Instead, he is aiming for a regional development scheme that would spend $700-million on big projects. None of the allies are happy with the heavy-handed American approach, but all recognize that, whatever the official command structure in the south, the Americans, soon to put 17,000 more troops into Afghanistan, control the agenda. They will fight the war their way [emphasis added].

So what does this mean for Canada's Afghan commitment? First, it means the U.S. Army will soon be directing the battle against the Taliban and the counternarcotics fight in Kandahar. The Canadians' ability to determine their own approach will be seriously constrained, if not completely subordinated to American direction. Second, it means the "stovepiped" approach to combat and development will disappear, assuming that Gen. Nicholson gets his way. And he probably will. Reconstruction and the battle against the insurgents will be more closely integrated.

These U.S. plans are not foolish. Almost every Afghanistan watcher recognizes that the International Security Assistance Force command structure is a jerry-built house that must go if the war is to be won. But what will the response in Canada be to its soldiers serving under American command? Not good [emphasis added]. And how will Parliament react to tighter links between combat and development, something hitherto anathema to the Liberals, NDP and Bloc Québécois? This may be the issue that brings down the minority government.

In other words, there are certain to be more heated debates about Afghanistan in the coming months. The arrival of more American forces will almost certainly lead the Taliban to ramp up attacks in the south, and the casualties may be heavy. And the insurgents, alarmingly well-briefed on the political weak points of NATO's members, will certainly focus on the Canadian and Dutch forces [seen as the weak links].

Canadians at home and in the field need to be aware they will be tested. So, too, do the Americans, who might consider developing a more subtle approach at bringing their allies along with them [emphasis added].

J.L. Granatstein is a senior research fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.

Update considerations: In the view of a knowledgeable Canadian, two things are especially important to improve the international effort in Afstan:

1) A civilian with real authority to shape the overall strategy and the implementation of the whole range of international actions--a Paddy Ashdown type, not the relatively ineffective Kai Eide:

2) Unity of military command (which the US looks well on the way to making a fait accompli in the south). And the Americans essentially already run the other main combat area, Regional Command East--more here.

Maybe what will eventuate is that RCs South and East become US-run combat areas, formally or informally, with ISAF remaining in charge of the comparatively stable north and west.