Thursday, March 27, 2008

Why a two-tiered NATO may not be such a bad thing

Robert Kaplan sees some silver in those grey Afghan clouds:
WITH NATO set to hold its annual summit next week in Bucharest, there is concern that the failure of Germany and other members to carry a larger share of the burden in Afghanistan is threatening the alliance’s future. Critics complain that it has become an unequal, two-tiered alliance, with the troops of the United States, Britain, Canada and Holland taking the combat role while Germany, Italy, Spain and other members take refuge in the safe areas, refusing to put their soldiers in danger.

It certainly isn’t fair. Yet predictions of NATO’s decline hold it to an impossible cold war standard. Then, a direct mortal threat to Central Europe in the form of Red Army divisions led to an all-for-one and one-for-all mentality. Now that the threat is more subtle and diverse, NATO’s mandate, structure and personality need to change accordingly...

Let’s face it, the threat of a Taliban comeback in Afghanistan is not of the same order as the threat Germany faced from the Soviet Union, so is it any wonder that Germany’s attitude has changed? Rather than bully the Germans into doing what they’re not very good at — counterinsurgency — in the violent south of Afghanistan, we should be grateful that they’re doing something they are good at — nation-building — in the relatively peaceful north.

The same holds for countries like Italy and Spain, whose troops are also restricted to northern Afghanistan. In the post-cold-war world, individual NATO members can’t be expected to automatically take part in missions outside the alliance’s traditional European sphere. Participation will be contingent on specific circumstances. And that will lead to an increasingly stratified alliance...

...countries like the United States and Britain will simply have to carry a heavier burden than others. But what of it? NATO has always operated as a multi-tiered organization. During the cold war, northern countries essentially ran the show while the southern ones went meekly along (except for Greece, which often protested loudly). France, in a fit of Gaullist pique, pulled out of NATO’s unified military structure in 1966, although it remains part of the alliance and took a place on the military committee in 1995.

Had there ever been a land war in Europe, American forces would have done the overwhelming amount of the fighting, so why should Afghanistan and future armed clashes be any different? NATO forces were never deployed in a war zone during the cold war, so the inequalities within the organization were masked...

For now...we must also look to expand appropriate roles for NATO members not inclined toward combat. One option is sea power. Navies make port visits, they protect sea lanes, they allow for access during humanitarian emergencies. The French, Dutch, Norwegians, Germans and Spanish have all been making serious investments in new ships, especially frigates. With the United States Navy concentrating on competition from China in the Pacific, NATO could become the primary naval force to patrol the North Atlantic and Mediterranean...
I especially like that last paragraph. The Euros have very decent navies (Italians too); giving them more maritime responsibility might also allow Canada to reduce our "blue water" (as opposed to off-shore) naval efforts, i.e. destroyers and frigates. I really do not see the need for a significant and expensive Canadian contribution to allies in distant waters. After all it's primarily the Army that our governments use for important foreign policy effects (see Somalia, Balkans, Afstan etc.). It certainly needs to be larger and to have greater budgetary investment.

But of course the Navy would scream horribly at any reduced role (look at their determined struggle to retain a submarine capabilty). And building and refitting major naval vessels in Canada is a vote-grabber that no party is ever likely to reliquish.

I await the torpedo tracks.

The Economist, for its part, has a major article on NATO, with nice charts. Note that The Netherlands' defence spending is US $11.1 billion while Canada's is US $18.5 billion. The Netherlands' population is almost exactly half Canada's 33 million. So on a per capita basis their defence budget would be US $22.2 billion. The war mongers.

5 Comments:

Blogger Positroll said...

"Had there ever been a land war in Europe, American forces would have done the overwhelming amount of the fighting"
Whom is he kidding? 1980-1990:
West German Army: > 300.000 + 450.000 reserves (Territorialheer)
East German Army: > 100.000 + 200.000
U.S. forces in Europe: 200-300.000 (+REFORGER)

6:20 a.m., March 28, 2008  
Blogger Eric said...

wonder what happened to my post
eric elerhe@eastlink.ca

9:06 a.m., March 28, 2008  
Blogger Babbling Brooks said...

Cmdre, it looks like the wayward comment was attached to another thread. I've reposted it here in its entirety for you:

The Army provides the Canada's most important foreign policy effect? And then you list Somalia? I suppose you could describe the press that resulted from this deployment as an "effect."
Further, if Canada is happy to wait six months to two years after a major international event for such "effects" to occur it will send the Army (World War I, World War II, Korea). If the government wanted an effect in something like real time, it sent the Navy (World War I, World War II, Korea, Gulf War I, and War on Terror).
Sending the army has also brought the attending unwanted "effect" of national division (World War I conscription crisis, World War II conscription crisis, Afganistan?)

Further, if might not be wise to put too much more emphasis on the alleged unique foreign policy benefits of army deployments by virtue of their higher personnel and financial costs. The fact is, states have interests. They certainly do not have permanent friends and few have long memories. As a result, claims that a particular military contribution provides for greater foreign policy influence than another or that one can generate more credit or "effect" are doubtful. James Eayrs reviewed Western foreign policy and completely discounted the notion of gratitude or credit for past contributions. His saddest example is that of New Zealand and the Common Market’s efforts in the early 1960s to eliminate the duty free entry of its goods. France famously asked “what obligations have we towards New Zealanders?” and “Why are we bound to do anything for them?” dismissing the Belgian’s foreign minister’s reply that “twice in our lifetime their men have come over to be killed for freedom.” At the end of the day those sacrifices mattered not.
Vimy gave Canada international recognition but not long-term credit. And, despite our pleading to the United States and the UK post-1945, Canada was not considered for a UN Security Council seat – our significant WWII contribution and losses notwithstanding. The same pattern holds true today. The UK committed division-size forces to Iraq and suffered corresponding losses for little discernible credit in Washington. Congress utterly failed to halt a highly questionable steel industry duty that was punishing to Britain and of only modest US benefit despite a personal request from Prime Minister Blair to President Bush.

Each service brings its own special contribution to Canada's foreign policy. Our development efforts, diplomats, police, and election monitors are also major players here. To suggest one single element has value over others ignores both logic and history.

9:43 a.m., March 28, 2008  
Blogger Babbling Brooks said...

Mark, unless I'm grossly misreading the intent of not only this post, but of your posts in general on the Navy over the course of the past couple of years, I'm in fundamental disagreement with your assessment of Canada's naval needs.

We live in a country that has the second longest coastline in the world to defend. All of our traditional allies save one are located across thousands of miles of open ocean. Our security strategy, at its most basic level, is founded upon the idea of collective security and the rule of international law.

The idea that we can shirk our naval responsibilities - both foreign and domestic - and still be the beneficiary of others' military largesse is distasteful in the short-term and unrealistic in the long term.

We need a stronger navy, not a weaker one.

9:55 a.m., March 28, 2008  
Blogger Dave in Pa. said...

I can't agree with Kaplan's rationale and excuse for the non-combat-participating NATO members.

"...Rather than bully the Germans into doing what they’re not very good at — counterinsurgency — in the violent south of Afghanistan, we should be grateful that they’re doing something they are good at — nation-building — in the relatively peaceful north.

The same holds for countries like Italy and Spain, whose troops are also restricted to northern Afghanistan. In the post-cold-war world, individual NATO members can’t be expected to automatically take part in missions outside the alliance’s traditional European sphere..."


The MSM and political elites of those nations have incessantly berated America for "unilateralism" and "not acting multilaterally". Well, here we have a UN Security Council-sanctioned combat campaign, being done under the aegis of NATO, very much desired by the new, democratically elected Constitutional Government of Af-stan. All the criteria of "multilateral" are met and then some.

Despite this fact, their MSMs are mostly addicted to US-bashing, Bush-bashing and leftism of the type espoused by the hard left of the European MSM. Their political elites are too provincial and/or cowardly to risk exerting real leadership in their countries by educating their people with the valid reasons for sending their forces into combat in Af-stan.

IMO, the truth is that those nations-Germany, Spain, Italy-are irresponsible, hypocritical slackers.

12:21 p.m., March 28, 2008  

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