Tuesday, February 05, 2008

COIN expertise

There's an interesting post up at the National Post blogs site, which seems to have been written by Christopher Sands, a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. It deals with counterinsurgency lessons-learned by American forces in Iraq under General Petraeus, and their possible application in Afghanistan by NATO forces.

While I'm all for the sharing of winning strategy and tactics among allies, I think this passage from the article is representative of the overall attitude pervading the piece and specifically that section of the American security establishment pushing for the solutions the article proposes:

The trouble is, most of the NATO allies with troops in Afghanistan are unfamiliar with the new U.S. counter-insurgency strategy, and have no experience with some of the innovative tactics that employ the latest technology to support soldiers in close contact with civilians. This was the crux of Secretary Gates’ Jan. 16 complaint. Even the British, who were in Iraq with the Americans, left before the counter-insurgency strategy was applied in their zone.

The United States needs to launch a major effort to train allies, particularly those with troops in the field alongside its own, in its new counter-insurgency approach. Veteran U.S. troops rotating off tours in Iraq with fresh, personal experiences with counter-insurgency would be the ideal instructors since they can offer more than the manual’s basic guidance, getting at the heart of the strategy: forging close bonds with local allies whose knowledge of the people and terrain is critical to winning local hearts and minds.


A number of assumptions underlie this approach. First, that the U.S. strategy is the correct one. While it has shown real short-term results in Iraq, it remains to be seen if this tack will produce the desired long-term results. Second, can the strategy be applied to the volatile trans-national Pashto regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan? Third, is the approach Canadian and other NATO forces in the south are currently employing so different from the Americans' preferred approach, and is it the wrong one? Fourth, even if the answers to the first three questions are affirmative, are the Americans the ones best suited to push for the change in strategy?

I have my doubts. And, given the extraordinary tone of Prince Andrew, the Duke of York in an article in the Times Online, I'm not alone:

The Duke of York has criticised the foreign policy of the United States, saying the fallout from Iraq has fuelled a “healthy scepticism” towards the country.

In a rare departure from Royal Family protocol, the Duke said that the post-invasion chaos in Iraq could have been avoided if George Bush’s Government had paid heed to British advice.

On the eve of a ten-day visit to the United States as trade envoy, the Duke said that Britain’s imperial history had allowed it to garner invaluable international experience.

He said that there were “occasions when people in the UK would wish that those in responsible positions in the US might listen and learn from our experiences”.

“If you are looking at colonialism, if you are looking at operations on an international scale, if you are looking at understanding each other’s culture, understanding how to operate in a military insurgency campaign – we have been through them all," he said in an interview with the International Herald Tribune.

“We’ve won some, lost some, drawn some. The fact is there is quite a lot of experience over here which is valid and should be listened to.”

He added that the fallout from Iraq had fuelled “healthy scepticism” toward what is said in Washington, and a feeling of “why didn't anyone listen to what was said and the advice that was given”.


Even if the U.S. has something to teach the rest of us, I'm not sure her closest allies are all that inclined to listen, especially given the lack of listening in the other direction a few years back.

Perhaps a little more humility in their public pronouncements, and a little less criticism of those who, in the final analysis, aren't the ones who nearly blew it in two separate conflicts over the course of the past seven years might help smooth the way.

2 Comments:

Anonymous Anonymous said...

a good read . . might be what the article is discussing.


http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/coinandiwinatribalsociety.pdf

5:16 p.m., February 05, 2008  
Blogger Cameron Campbell said...

I have to say that it's really nice to see someone who has exactly nothing to lose come off the bench every once and a while. I wouldn't want him mouthing off all the time, but it's refreshing none the less.

10:32 a.m., February 06, 2008  

Post a Comment

<< Home