Afstan update

Several things:

Afghan Military Seeks More Equipment

Military Weighs Recruiting Afghan Tribes to Fight Taliban

US backs Lord Ashdown for Afghanistan role (more towards the end of this post, plus more on Lord Ashdown)

Understanding Afghanistan

The Senlis Council's November 2007 report, "Stumbling into Chaos: Afghanistan on the Brink," presents an oft-repeated argument that a one-dimensional, military-focused approach is a recipe for failure in Afghanistan. That human and economic development are quintessential elements of stabilization in conflict countries is a universally accepted concept.

Senlis further argues that the donor agencies are unable to deliver the essential development services "fast enough" and that Afghanistan's reconstruction and development is at a "stand-still." High child-mortality, and lack of access to basic education, safe drinking water and health services are cited, together with hunger, and a humanitarian crisis faced by returned refugees and people internally displaced by the ravages of war against the Taliban.

As usual, the Senlis Council offers a mixed bag of immediate crises requiring emergency relief efforts and longer-term development challenges. The common denominator is that Senlis tugs on the heartstrings of its audience without addressing the realities faced by complex organizations with specific mandates facing those same intransigent problems on the ground.

A series of Senlis Council reports has focused on visible short-term fixes that can only provide temporary relief through food distribution, hospital financing, road construction for quick and easy access to facilities and water supply, and so on. This reflects the chronic confusion between short-term relief and longer-term development.

Relief efforts, if not strategically planned for longer term development results, can have a negative impact...

Some of the longer term development inadequacies, cited by Senlis, are real. But the claim that no "visible" improvements have been made is grossly misleading. In fact, one may argue that the principal accomplishments in Afghanistan are in the realm of social and economic development, not in security, and undoubtedly the development progress made so far is under serious threat from deteriorating security...

It must be understood that there are no quick fixes in Afghanistan. In a country ravaged by decades of war and with a slim skilled human resource base, even massive reconstruction and development efforts will not yield immediate results, especially in remote rural areas. It will take generations to make the advances expected. Fanning unrealistic expectations of the Afghan public and the publics of the donor countries is the last thing that should be done to temper tensions at these critical times.

Sustainable social, economic and political transformation that will mark longer term development can only be done through Afghan state institutions and with the support of Afghan civil society. The institutions that will lead the transformation process must be strengthened. Continued international support is critical for this strengthening process. Diverting the resources and attention of development agencies toward the short-term will not help build a sustainable peace.

The Senlis Council's extraordinary proposal that NATO should "move into Pakistan," offered in its latest report, is of a piece with the lamentable penchant for moral indignation married to superficial policy that typifies its analysis of the overall challenges facing Afghanistan.

Nipa Banerjee served as the head of Canada's aid program in Kabul from 2003 to 2006.

The Senlis report is here, with some other reactions around the middle of this post.