The development partner

Canada's strategy in Afghanistan is founded upon three pillars, or "the 3D approach": defence, diplomacy, and development. The focal point of criticism of that mission here in Canada has been that we concentrate too much on defence, and not enough on the other two aspects, and the CF has taken the brunt of that criticism. But over the course of the past week, the CF has gotten a small respite as CIDA has taken over as the whipping boy of choice.

The Senate committee thinks it should be abolished, but not before another Senate panel suggested it give over $20M of its budget immediately to the CF to distribute more effectively in Kandahar.

Journalists have piled on:

It's too bad that the civilian agencies like CIDA, didn't follow that up by injecting a massive amount of aid into the area to secure the victory. That's how it's supposed to work; secure the area, then secure the peace. But that didn't happen. It might have made the area a whole lot safer for this next rotation of troops. Hopefully they've learned a lesson.

And the criticism isn't new, it's just broken to the surface. Retired Commodore Eric Lehre made the case months ago that the 3D model can't even be judged at this point because nobody other than defence is even trying:

Until that review is complete and until CIDA can generate the personnel and financial resources to re-qualify for membership in the 3-D partnership, the concept should be put into abeyance. In the interim, the military commander should be immediately given the $30 million his U.S counterparts enjoy for local development projects and, most critically, the local authority to spend it rapidly. He should be provided whatever federal officials or military officers are needed to ensure funding and project delivery follows within two weeks of a local agreement. As quickly as the security situation allows and as quickly as CIDA can generate a meaningful contribution, the military commander should return the coordination of development over to the development experts.

Even the newspaper editorialists have gotten into the act:

Whatever the solution, the commitment that Canadians have to maintaining and increasing foreign aid is deeply held, a humanitarianism that deserves a better vehicle to carry it out than CIDA has offered.

Are these criticisms fair? Perhaps. But I'd ask you to look at CIDA's performance in context.

CIDA isn't an NGO, it's a branch of the Government of Canada. I think sometimes people forget that. If you want it to be more agile, more responsive, more aggressive, then tell your MP. Because the government created it, and only the government can fix it:

"CIDA has developed a reputation as one of the slowest bilateral aid agencies in the world," testified Ian Smillie, research co-ordinator of Partnership Africa Canada. "We have more checklists, forms, studies, consultancies and evaluations than any other donor I know. We are pathologically risk averse."

When an organization is "risk averse," it's because mistakes are punished harshly, and bold action isn't rewarded generously. I deal with this mindset every day in my work. It's a standing joke that nobody at an insurance company was ever fired for saying "No, it's too risky." I suspect the same is true of CIDA.

This story by Murray Brewster of the Canadian Press backs up my contention in an article from January 15th, 2007:

The killing made it harder to recruit civilians into PRT positions, said Grant.

The two governmental agencies virtually pulled out of the PRT from the time of the attack until April of last year, stalling a number of programs. At the same time, CIDA halted spending on rebuilding programs amid a further wave of suicide bombings.

When staff finally did return to the ground, they were prohibited from travelling by road, forcing the army to arrange helicopter rides, even for short trips to nearby Kandahar Airfield, where the bulk of Canada's 2,500 troops are based.

The restrictions made accomplishing anything painfully slow.

The rules have been relaxed somewhat, especially after Prime Minister Stephen Harper's Conservative government was accused in the House of Commons of concentrating more on war and less on aid. Even now, civilian staff are unable to venture very far beyond the heavily fortified compound that is the provincial reconstruction base.

Despite that, the man who replaced Berry says they're still able to complete their mission even though they're often forced to ask Afghan authorities to meet with them behind the razor wire.

"Our job is slightly more difficult to do and perhaps takes a little more time to accomplish things," Gavin Buchan said in an interview Sunday.

"In a perfect world, of course, I'd love to be out there on a bicycle or walking down a street talking to people in a market. That is how the most effective diplomacy gets conducted. But you can't do that in the current environment. That's simply the reality. We work as effectively as we can given the security constraints."

Last fall, a senior military planner with the Defence Department told the Senate security and defence committee that the army was having a hard time getting CIDA to cough up already approved funding for Afghan redevelopment programs.

In case you missed it, CIDA employees can't even travel by road. For them to actually get off the base and out into the boonies where the aid projects are actually happening, they need to bum a helicopter ride. Assuming a helicopter is available, and that the troops in that area actually have the time or inclination to secure an HLZ at the village the development specialist wants to visit, that is.

The situation is ridiculous. And the blame for it rests squarely with the federal government - this one, the last one, the one before that, who cares? People don't become aid workers to fill out bureaucratic forms in quintuplicate before handing some dirt-poor peasant a blanket. They don't become aid workers so that they can sit around on their duff in a PRT in Afghanistan with no ability to do their jobs. They don't sign up specifically to be ineffective.

So untie their hands. Our soldiers do a damned good job, but they're not development specialists. The CF needs CIDA to be a full partner in the Afghan mission. And the Government of Canada is the only body that can make that happen.

Update: Some interesting commentary from a number of the folks writing over at Macleans.ca - all the comments are quite worth reading. I found this snippet particularly interesting:

Last fall, I spoke with Ashraf Ghani, a former top World Bank official and a former chief advisor to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, now chancellor of Kabul University. He's a sage and candid commentator on what's happening in his home country. I asked Ghani what he thought of CIDA, and this was his informed reply:

"It's one of the best. I have enormous respect for [CIDA president and former Bombardier executive] Robert Greenhill. But you know he comes from business management, and he needs to change the culture of an organization that is used to slow and steady. And slow and steady gives you accountability, but it doesn't give you rapid results in the context of Afghanistan. That means the rules and regulations of CIDA have to change."

Something about babies and bathwater comes to mind.