Afstan: How to win--and lose

Excerpts from a press briefing in December by Anthony Cordesman (recently returned from Afstan) of the Center for Strategic & International Studies--the CSIS the rest of the world recognizes, Washington (via Bruce Rolston at Flit--whole thing well worth reading):

...building a successful Afghan government, particularly because we have done so little since 2001 to do that, takes time...

This is a winnable war. There will be problems with Pakistan. There will be problems with our allies. We do need probably a doubling of our infantry presence for U.S. forces, and more Special Forces. But these aren’t brigades; these are battalions. We need to bring our allies fully into the fight, and at least in the south with the British, there needs to be reinforcement. But these are very limited numbers of people. When you look at the list here, what you see too is the problem is not the way NATO is organized; it is the way member countries fail to participate in that organization fully and effectively. We don’t have a problem with NATO; we have a problem with member countries, and that is a very important distinction to remember.

I’ve already talked to you about the urgency. The fact is that we will go into the 2007 offensive in the spring unready to really make a difference. The most we could do is to put pressure on our allies, Pakistan, and try to move our own troops in...

Blaming the Iraqis or the Afghanis [sic] for this rather than saying, it’s going to take adequate resources and time, is the recipe to lose. We already made the mistake in Iraq. It is recoverable at least in Afghanistan. Pakistan – let me be blunt again. One of the problems is this is a two-country war. Denying that because it is politically correct or diplomatically tactful ignores the realities necessary to win.

The steps toward victory I’ve already outlined. They are probably about two more U.S. infantry battalions and more Special Forces. British reinforcements are needed. The problem – the bargain they made in the south is the Taliban influence we can’t afford. We need to have the stand-aside forces come online. We need a major increase not only in our own aid program, but we need our allies to join in that aid program, and it has to move into the field and not in dealing with capitals. And above all, we need to patiently work with the Afghan government to develop the capability so it can become effective over time.

Let me just make one quick point. If you’re wondering what the importance of stand-aside forces is, take a look at the map. The French are supposed to be providing security in Kabul. They are only reactive, not proactive. Look where the German and Spanish forces are. Look at the limited areas we control as U. S. forces, and look at the importance of the British, Canadian and Dutch contribution. This cannot be won through American action, and it cannot be won unless NATO countries allow NATO to be effective...

To make things work and to win, you have to have a strategy that deals with the military side and the police side. You have to have criminal justice. That is one key element of governance. You have to have effective governance. You have to have incentives for national unity. If you fail in any given dimension, you tend to lose in counterinsurgency. This has been a message every since Malaysia, but it was also in the handbooks the U.S. issued after our campaign in the Philippines nearly a century ago – in fact, more than a century ago. These aren’t new lessons, but they’re lessons we have to learn...

And in answer to a question from the audience:

Now, one problem we have here that I didn’t show on these charts but is very clear in the detailed briefing I’ve given you – we wouldn’t have had tactical victory in 2006 if we hadn’t flown at least as many strike sorties in support of forces in Afghanistan as we did in Iraq, and during peak periods of the offensives, we often flew far more sorties. Here is the practical problem: Without adequate troops on the ground, even with what are amazing advances in intelligence and surveillance, you are going to have repeated incidents where you hit civilians and you cause collateral damage. The reality is no matter what you do, you cannot attack insurgents and hostile groups without attacking women and children because you cannot separate them...

Note this today:

"The single thing that we have done wrong and we are striving extremely hard to improve on (in 2007) is killing innocent civilians," Brig. Richard E. Nugee, the chief spokesman for NATO's International Security Assistance Force, told a news conference...