Ebb and flow
Bruce Rolston at flit has an interesting set of posts up about U.S. and allied casualties in Iraq, where he attempts to draw some conclusions from the raw data (see here, here, here, and here). Bruce has probably forgotten more about statistics than I'll ever know, so bear with me here. Because I'm going to ask more questions about the allied experience in Afghanistan than I'm going to answer.
It seems fairly widely accepted that armed conflict in Afghanistan is a seasonal beast that largely hibernates in the winter months. I know plotting allied military fatalities against time is a rough tool with which to examine that idea, but absent decent data on overall casualties (which the CF won't release - I asked) or allied op tempo in the country, it's really all we have to work with. Here's how it graphs out:
The bold red-brown line is an average. You'll note that it doesn't rise and fall cleanly along with a seasonal cycle. The worst four months, in descending order, are August (14.4), June (13.2), September (11.4), and March (9.6). The best are December (3.6), November (4.8), July (5.0), and January (5.6).
In fact, the increase in violence of 2005 and 2006 has an overwhelming effect on the overall numbers. Which makes me wonder a few things.
First, does the intensity of warfare in Afghanistan correspond more closely with the season or with the actions of allied forces? If BGen Fraser hadn't taken such an aggressive line on finding and engaging with Taliban forces in the south - especially with Op Medusa - would the overall numbers trend even less towards a seasonal interpretation? Correspondingly, if Major General Van Loon were to push over the winter months, would mortal casualties jump accordingly? Or would our soldiers find the enemy has abandoned the field to hunker down for the winter?
My guess is that it's a combination of at least those two factors. Our pattern of engaging insurgent forces probably follows their willingness to fight, which may well be seasonal. But it also undoubtedly follows our aggressiveness. How much of each factor should weigh into the analysis? I'll leave that to the statisticians.
It seems fairly widely accepted that armed conflict in Afghanistan is a seasonal beast that largely hibernates in the winter months. I know plotting allied military fatalities against time is a rough tool with which to examine that idea, but absent decent data on overall casualties (which the CF won't release - I asked) or allied op tempo in the country, it's really all we have to work with. Here's how it graphs out:
The bold red-brown line is an average. You'll note that it doesn't rise and fall cleanly along with a seasonal cycle. The worst four months, in descending order, are August (14.4), June (13.2), September (11.4), and March (9.6). The best are December (3.6), November (4.8), July (5.0), and January (5.6).
In fact, the increase in violence of 2005 and 2006 has an overwhelming effect on the overall numbers. Which makes me wonder a few things.
First, does the intensity of warfare in Afghanistan correspond more closely with the season or with the actions of allied forces? If BGen Fraser hadn't taken such an aggressive line on finding and engaging with Taliban forces in the south - especially with Op Medusa - would the overall numbers trend even less towards a seasonal interpretation? Correspondingly, if Major General Van Loon were to push over the winter months, would mortal casualties jump accordingly? Or would our soldiers find the enemy has abandoned the field to hunker down for the winter?
My guess is that it's a combination of at least those two factors. Our pattern of engaging insurgent forces probably follows their willingness to fight, which may well be seasonal. But it also undoubtedly follows our aggressiveness. How much of each factor should weigh into the analysis? I'll leave that to the statisticians.
posted by Babbling Brooks at 12:22 a.m.
1 Comments:
I wonder if there is a closer link to farming seasons for poppies.
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