CF procurements and requirements

An excellent survey at the Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies; I urge you to read the whole piece (h/t to Army.ca).

On the surface there seems little to criticize in last week’s spending package. The total price will be spread over 15-20 years, so it won’t break the bank. The military is not asking for anything particularly exotic, merely the basics. Buying what is essentially a diverse set of transport equipments is unlikely to offend anyone with tender sensibilities since they are not configured to shoot at anyone. And each will handily serve what looks to be the primary purposes of the CF of the 21^st century: the security of the home front and stabilization of failed states.

But the five projects will not in and of themselves resolve all the operations shortcomings facing the CF. The navy must deal with the impending loss of its destroyers, which act as command vessels for multi-ship task groups. The patrol frigate fleet is overdue for a mid-life upgrade. The airframes of the Aurora patrol aircraft fleet are wearing out, with implications for the surveillance of Canadian territory. The (arguably good) decision to cancel of the Mobile Gun System (MGS) and Multi-mission Effects Vehicle (MMEV) will leave the army with fewer options to counter ground and air threats (although irregular forces do not normally posses tanks or atttack aircraft). And equipment lost to either enemy action or to the tough environmental conditions in Afghanistan will need replacement if Canada is to remain in theatre until 2008.

Laying out funds for procurement is arguably the easy part. Awarding contracts and having a successor government honour them will be harder. Recall how Jean Chrétien cancelled the Mulroney Conservatives’ EH-101 helicopter contract, even if it meant paying stiff financial penalties. Desperate to discredit the Harper government, the Grits could turn the C-17 buy into an election issue.

And ensuring that there are trained personnel to operate and maintain the new equipment will present this and future governments with an even greater challenge. New gear might serve as a useful recruiting tool, but it will take more to convince a newly-minted C-17 pilot that he should not simply finish up his tour and sell what he has learned to Air Canada.

David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.

And there there are the fixed-wing SAR replacement and the amphibious ship(s).